IN PROGRESS
Pleasure and Practical Actions
In this section, I argue that, according to Aristotle, pleasure is the final cause of our actions. This means that, for each of our virtuous actions, we not only aim at doing them and doing them well, but also enjoying doing them.Pleasure of Acting
In this section, I examined the current interpretations of Aristotle's view on the nature of pleasure from scholarship. I argue that these interpretations fail to address the pleasure of acting.Kinesis-based Pleasure and Aristotle’s Objections
In this section, I present Aristotle's objections to the kinesis-based pleasure view that is taken by natural scientists as well as Plato's Socrates in the Philebus. Aristotle's objection is based on a distinction between things that are pleasant with qualification and without qualification. I argue that this distinction is intelligible only with a reference to the pleasure of acting.
Pleasure and Virtuous Actions
In this section, I aim to discuss the principle of change in relation to practical actions. Having gained an understanding of energeia in Aristotle's Metaphysics, I now proceed to apply this concept to energeia-based pleasure in his ethical framework. The principle of change in practical actions serves as a crucial factor in this application.
UNDER REVIEW
"Ti esti energeia in Metaphysics 9.6"
In this section, I examine Aristotle's Metaphysics 9.6 to gain an understanding of the notion of energeia. I analyze Aristotle's claim that there is no need of a definition for everything and the analogy that Aristotle provides to illustrate what energeia is in the text Met. 9.6 1048a36-1048b7.
"Energeia and being in energeia"
In this section, I conducted an examination of Aristotle's usage of the word energeia in both the nominative and dative forms throughout Book 9. Based on my analysis, I arrived at the conclusion that Aristotle discusses being "in energeia" (dative) as a means of addressing the question of "ti esti energeia" (what is energeia).
"Energeia as actuality"
In this section, I present a counter-argument to the interpretation that being in energeia is the default setting of being. I argue that being in energeia should only be understood as a consequence of the principle of change. Consequently, energeia represents the actuality of being as a result of the principle of change.
"The Passage(Met.1048b18-35)"
In this section, I turn to the passage, Metaphysics 1048b18-35, where energeia is contrasted with kinesis. I argue that in this passage, Aristotle's intention is not to explain "ti esti energeia", but rather to apply the established framework regarding energeia to practical actions. This analysis of the Passage is necessary in preparing for an understanding of the kinesis-energeia distinction mentioned in Nicomachean Ethics, especially in Book X.